Psychologists have long recognized the need for prescriptions within their own small province of English. The Publication Jl11nual of the American Psychological Association is a miniature prescrip tive grammar for psychological literature, a small subdivision of the more comprehensive prescrip tive grammar needed for the language as a whole. But psychologists have viewed larger presC:'iptive issues as the exclusive concern of linguists and have largely ignored the prescriptive grammar of English as a fruitful or relevant dorr.ain for psycho logical inquiry.
The present article argues that these views are mistal;.en; that linguists are unlik.ely"to sol';e or even to investigate pre:,criptive problems; "that existing p·rescriptions incorporate important psy chological assumptions that warrant eperimental testing; that psychological methods, data, and theories are needed to ass"ess potential prescrip tions; and that psychology has 'much to gain by investigating prescriptive issues and by helping to develop principled proced:Jres for prescriptive grammar.
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People using English want and need to know the most acceptable words and rules to learn in order to communicate effectively in formal contexts. The goal of prescriptive grammar is to determine and to teach those rules. Neither the desire nor the need for prescriptive grammar is likely to dimin ish over time. Children and members of other cultures who wish to learn English will continue to wanl to know the most acceptable forms to learn. And, like every other living language, English will continue to change and to give rise to new alternatives; therefore, prescriptive grammar will continue to be needed to determine the most useful alternative words and phrases for future speakers and writers.
. Linguists are unlikely to become involved in as sessing potential changes in prescriptive recom mendations, since the goal of linguistics is to de scribe the regularities underlying existing language use. Linguists regard their descriptive approach as incompatible with the aim of changing what is ~ound in a .speech community and so have avoided prescriptive issues, conscien tiously attempting not to alter the speech patte:-ns they study. The lack of cooperation, fruitful interaction, or even contact between. linguists and students of prescriptive grammar over the last half century (see Bodine, 1975) is therefore likely tei conlinue indefinitely. And a "leave it to linguistics" attitude in psy-chology will mean that future prescriptions for changes in the rules of English grammar are likely to remain narrow and uninformed, motivated by unconscious biases rather than by general prin ciples (Bolinger, 1975) .
ASSUMPTIONS USED TO SUPPORT THE PRESCRIPTIVE "HE"
The present study examines a single prescriptive issue in detail-the use of he to mean "he or she." The original prescription began over 250 years ago and, according to the evidence of Bodine (1975) , reflected the social biases of male prescriptivists rather than their professed goals of precision, ele gance, and logical form. Contemporary writers continue to use the prescriptive he, which is still recommended in over 8570 of a recent sample of American textbooks (Bodine, 1975) . Current at tempts to analyze and defend this prescription in corporate sophisticated but untested psychological assumptions, three of which can be outlined as follows:
The pronominal-surrogate assumption maintains that pronouns simply stand for their antecedents and contribute no new meaning of their own. In particular, it is assumed that prescriptive he sim ply designates a sex-indefinite antecedent, such as person, without excluding women or adding new meaning of its own.
The semantic-flexibility assumption maintains that the meaning of a word is highly flexible and can be established by declaration. In the case of nouns, the strategy of proposing and adopting a special-purpose definition for a common noun in some new domain of use is remarkably common (see Britton, 1978) . For example, psychologists defined and used the word reinforcement in a sense far removed from its original dictionary definition, and this special-purpose definition has now become Widely accepted. People oiten experience little or no difficulty in understanding or learning special purpose definitions, and if this is true in general, then Humpty Dumpty was correct in maintaining, "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less" (Carroll, 1872 (Carroll, /1936 . Likewise, Burgess (1976) would-be correct in declaringbis intended use of prescrip tive he to be unambiguously neutral and in accus ing those who thou;ht otherwise oi forcing "chau vinistic sex onto the word."
The context assumption also rests on a question able analogy between nouns and pronouns. Un- .sO
No/e. Phonemic representations follow Tralter and Smith (1951) .
der the context assumption, prescriptive he resem bles an ambiguous noun that carries out multiple semantic duties but is nevertheless readily inter preted on the basis of situation or sentence con text. For example, when listening to a gasoline commercial, we don't confuse a tank for gasoline with a tank for military destruction. And under the context assumption, we do not confuse pre scriptive he in contexts referring to people with specific he in contexts referring to men.
Testing the Validity of Assumptions Supporting Prescriptive He
To test these psychological assumptions, subjects in the present study read paragraphs containing prescriptive he's referring to neutral antecedents (e.g., person, writer) and then answered a series of multiple-choice comprehension questions, one of which indirectly, and unbeknownst to the subjects, assessed comprehension of prescriptive he and its antecedents.
The experiment also examined how subjects com prehended a new pronoun encountered for the first time without explanation, under the same condi tions as the subjects reading prescriptive he. . The main question was the communicative efficiency of substitutive neologisms, a potential solution to the problem of prescriptive he with advantages dis cussed in Spencer (19; 8) . To determine whether our procedures could discriminate between highly similar alternatives within the class of substitutive
...,;.
• &-cS:'od• . ....· * ; · 9 eft . ' 'oki . neologisms, the examples selected (E, e, tey) were all derivatives of existing pronouns (see Table 1 ).
METHOD
Materials. The materials were chosen to resemble those encountered in the everyday experience of university students: paragraphs from a textbook in current use on writing (:\1acauley & 'La'rming, 1964) . The two paragraphs were modified only slightly to maintain equivalent length (about 150 words) and number of prescriptive he's (n = 12 in nominative, possessive, and accusative cases). The prescriptive he's referred to relatively neutral antecedents, which 80 subjects of : MacKay and Fulkerson (1979) Subjects and procedure. Forty undergraduates from the UCLA subject pool received course credit for their participation. They were randomly as signed to one of four groups, with the restriction that there be five males and five females per group. One group read paragraphs containing prescriptive he, another read paragraphs containing E, the third read paragraphs containing e, and the fourth read paragraphs containing tey.
A female experimenter instructed each subject individually as follows:
This is a studr of reading comprehension. You will read paragraphs either silently or aloud as rapidly as possible. The beginning and end of each paragraph are marked with the words START and STOP, which you are to read aloud in order to facilitate timing. You will then be given some brief questions to test your comprehension of the para graphs. The paragraphs may contain one or more new words that you have never seen before, but read them as best you can and concentrate on understanding the mean ing of the paragraphs without lingering on new words. Are there any questions 1
The subjects read one paragraph aloud and the other silently, with the order of paragraphs and reading conditions counterbalanced across subjects. After each paragraph they used IB:\f cards to answer three multiple-choice comprehension .ques tions. One p"ronoun-comprehension question in directly tested comprehension of the antecedents of prescriptive he (E, e, or tey), for example, "The beginning writer discussed in the paragraph is: (a) male, (b) female, or (c) ei ther male or fe male." The remaining paragra?h-comprehension questions tested comprehension of other aspects of the content of the paragraph, for example, "Stu dents reaching the end of their school-going days will need to remember (a) how they can achieve style, (b) whatever sensible advice writers or critics have given them, (c) the maximum economy of language, or (d) the most important principle of modern fiction." Following the comprehension questions, which were identical for all four para graph conditions, the subjects reading E, e, and tey paragraphs defined what they thought their neologism meant. RESULTS ~lean reading time was 12.51 sec faster for para graphs that were read silently (34.31 sec) than for paragraphs read aloud (46.82 sec), and 4.79 sec faster for he paragraphs (37.05 sec) than for neologism paragraphs (41.84 sec). On the aver age, then, each encounter \vith a novel pronoun added about 040 sec to the mean reading time.. However, the newly encountered pronouns did not hinder comprehension of the paragraphs, since there was no significant difference in answers to the paragraph-comprehension questions for he, E, e, and tey, and all were significantly better than chance (i.e., than 2570 correct).
~loreover, pronoun-comprehension errors were significantly more frequent for he than for E, e, and tey, x~(3) = 43.96, P < .001. Specifically, 807c of the subjects who had read he paragraphs made at least one pronoun-comprehension error as opposed to 2070 of the subjects who had read paragraphs containing one of the neologisms. The probability of error-that is, of responding (a) male or (b) female rather than (c) male or female -was .50 for he paragraphs as compared to .13 for neologism paragraphs, and both probabilities dif, fered significantly (p < .01) from chance (33% correct). The females reading he paragraphs made exactly as many errors as the males. All of the errors involved choosing male rather than female, a difference significant at-the·.O 1 level, x 2 (1) = 10.0.
Availability of the "he or she" concept for E, e, arid tey initially seemed about equaL The proba bi1ity of error for prollour1-eornprehension questions (see Table I ) was .10 for E, .20 for e, and .10 for tey. Errors were evenly distributed over the first and second paragraphs for E and for e, but for tey, all of the errors occurred in the second para graph. The subjects' definitions following the comprehension questions indicated that this find- 
DISCUSSION
The results contradicted all of the assumptions outlined in the introduction. Implications of these findings for theories of comprehension are as follows:
The pronominal-surrogale assumption. The no tion that prescriptive he adds no new meaning to its antecedents is inaccurate, since 807"0 of the subjects on 7570 of the trials comprehended neu tral antecedents of prescriptive he-such as person, writer, or beginner-as ,n.a1e rather than nwle or female. These findings corroborate those ·of Kidd (1971 Kidd ( ), ~fartyna (1978 , and ~IacKay and Ful kerson (1979) and suggest that pronouns do more than just stand for nouns.
The semantic-flexibility assumption. The idea that word meanings are flexible and can be estab lished by declaration is inaccura teo .-\1 though our lit~rature, our schools, and our prescriptive gram mars have advertised the neutrality of prescriptive he for over two centuries, the present data indicate that prescriptive he is not· neutral. Some word meanings, including the male meaning of he, are so salient or so strongly engraved-in semantic memory that no special-purpose or context-re stricted meaning can displace them. .-\150, pro nouns maybe a poor vehicle for carrying special purpose deliilitions, since interpretation of pro nouns is already 50 flexible, varying with each Dew antecedent. Semantic incompatibility may pla~' a role as well. A viable 5~ondary me::!ning must be compatible with the primary meaning of an ambig uous word; in the case 0 f prescriptive he, how 447 • ~[,\Y 1930 • _-\.\1 El; I C,,:-.; PSYCHOLOGIST ever, the prescribed meaning is intended to include women and therefore contradicts the primary meaning, which excludes them. ~~ a consequence, the "he or she" concept is usually unavailable with he as the generic pronoun, but it becomes readily available wi~h a novel replacement.
The context assumption. Despite the context of the paragraphs in the present study, only 50% of the trials with he resulted in generic interpre tations and only 207<: of the subjects consistently gave generic interpretations to the prescriptive he. This finding indicates that context is ineffective in resolving the ambiguity of prescriptive he, and the question is why. The impoverished semantic struct ure of pronouns provides one explanation. Alternate interpretations of ambiguous nouns, such as tank, differ by large numbers of referential dimensions, and the context can relate to any of these dimensions to resolve the ambiguity; how ever, alternate interpretations of he differ by only one value within a single dimension (gender), making contextual disambiguation more difficult. ::\Ioreover, English has evolved sophisticated syn tactic devices for modifying content words such as tank, unlike he, which allows no disambiguating modifiers whatsoever.
The manner in which we normally use pronouns in comprehending sentences may also limit the resolving power of context. People generally rely on pronouns and other function words to resolve the ambiguities of nouns, rather than to create new ambiguities of their own (see Bratley, Dewar, & Thorne, 1967) . For example, listeners seem to wait for use of size or he to enable them to deter mine gender when sex-indefinite nouns, such as child, . are used to designate specific individuals. Of course, lacking a truly generic pronoun for third-person singular, the only reason contempo rary speakers may attempt to resolve the gender of sex-indefinite nouns is to avoid errors in using the only pronouns available: she and he.
Positive feedback due to the salience of the male -interpretation of prescriptive he may-also limit the resolving power of context. The argument is as follows: \\-ith the help of context people normally perceive one arid only one interpretation of ambig uous WOLds, but they perceive salient or common meanings more readily than nonsalient or uncom mon ones (see :'lad':'ay, 19iO) . As a result, salient or common meanings may be perceived even when context favors the alternate interpretation. In particular, speakers 0 f English encounter the 5fle{:ific use of he about 10 to 20 times as often as the supposedly generic use (see Graham, 1973) , and they tend to perceive the male interpretation of prescriptive he even in clearly generic contexts. The end result is a positive feedback cycle: The relative infrequency of prescriptive he fosters non generic interpretations, but the more frequently prescriptive he is interpreted nongenerically, the greater the likelihood of nongeneric interpretations in the future. This positive feedback cycle ex plains the relative ineffectiveness of context in the present study. The fact that positive feedback increases as a function of age and experience also ] explains why adults, who habitually use prescrip tive he, rarely perceive the conflict of gender be tween the pronoun and its antecedent, unlike children who are encountering prescriptive he for the first time (see Nilsen, 1977) .
The Implications for Prescriptive Grammar
The present data indicate that prescriptive he is defective and confirm the importance of avoiding its use. As presumed in the "Guidelines for :Non sexist Language in APA Journals" (APA Publica tion Manual Task Force, 1977), prescriptive he clearly influences normal comprehension in such a way as to create or maintain sex bias. However, the present experiment represents only a first step in the search for new principles a~d procedures for prescriptive grammar in order to prevent de fective prescriptions in the future. Many other problems remain. One is how to evaluate dis parate prescriptive alternatives. For example, further research is needed into the general costs and benefits of neologisms such as E to pennit comparison with already existing alternatives such as he or she and singular they, which introduce problems of their own. The present data indicate that encountering a neologism without explanation is sQmet)mes sufficient to accurately convey a new concept, or rather to make available an already ] existing, independently formed concept, because the subjects probably inferred that E and e meant \ "he or she" on the basis of real-world experience with-referenC classes, such as wrileror person.
The data also show that some neologisms are superior to others in conceptual availability and first-encounter pronounceability, since ley was more frequently misinterpreted and e was more fre quently mispronounced than E.
Whether E is the best possible neologism is an ·other matter.
Determining a "best possible" neologism presents an unsolved problem of con siderable theoretical magnitude. Current theories suffice to distinguish between actual versus pos sible versus impossible words without regard to concepts, but such a project requires new theories for discriminating within the indefinitely large set of possible words to find the one most suited for expressing a particular concept like "he or she."
Of course, determining the besf possible lexical alternative for expressing this or any other con cept may be unnecessary for practical purposes. Since we mainly want something better than what we now have, ranking the best available alterna tives may suffice. The present study illustrates one procedure for ranking potential prescriptions with respect to communicative efficiency. The procedure is applicable not just to the "generic" masculine-which, as Jespersen (l924) pointed out, is "decidedly a defect in the English language" (p. 231 )-nor to defective words in general, nor even just to existing words and rules, but to neolo gisms and projected rules as well. It is to be hoped that such procedures will be used in advance of future prescriptions, rather than 250 years after the fact, as in the present case.
In the meantime, other psychological assu~p tions underlying the prescriptive use of he remain to be explored. For example, Lakoff (1973) as sumed that misinterpretation of prescriptive he in curs no serious psychological or social conse quences, and that although offensive to many, prescriptive he is a minor problem that is "less in need of changing" than other aspeds of sexist language are (p. 75). Others reject this triviality assumption and consider prescriptive he a loaded term, with subtle and powerful effects on the self concepts and attitudes of both men and women (e.g., see Geiwitz, 1978; Miller & Swift, 1976) . :\loreover, prescriptive he has too many character istics in common with highly effective propaganda techniques for the latter view to be ignored. As a device for shaping attitudes, prescriptive _he has the following advantages: frequency (over 10 it were a matter of common and well-established knowledge). It is also possible that prescriptive he has more general effects on the degree to which people allow evaluative attitudes to dominate their intellectual processes (see Leech, 1974, p. 61) .
The triviality assumption clearly raises issues that are central to theories of thought and attitudes as well as to theories of language behavior. Testing that assumption therefore promises theoretical and empirical rewards for psychology in general. And since other disciplines are unlikely to undertake such research, psychology has a responsibility to do so, as well as to help find an acceptable alterna tive to prescriptive he along with acceptable prin ciples for prescriptive grammar in general.
